CDS (II) 2022 General Knowledge · Question 107 of 120

Correct — D, It often acts as a check on democratic rule, particularly when their members are non-elected or indirectly elected. Read the option carefully and you will see it is written from the critics' side of the argument, not the defenders'. Every other option describes a check that friends of bicameralism praise — on a runaway majority, on the executive, on constitutional change. This one describes a check on democratic rule itself, and it supplies the reason that makes it an objection rather than a virtue: the second chamber's members are often not elected by the people at all. A body that has not faced the voters obstructing one that has is the classic charge against upper houses, made against the House of Lords for a century and against indirectly elected chambers everywhere. Three strengths and one criticism — the criticism is what the question wants.

• (a)Second chambers check the first chambers and prevent majoritarian rule. — A standard strength. Requiring a second, differently composed house to agree slows down a temporary majority in the lower house and forces a bill to survive more than one political moment.
• (b)It checks the powers of the executive. — Also a standard strength. In a parliamentary system the executive commands the lower house by definition, so questioning, debate and scrutiny in a chamber it does not control is one of the few real restraints available.
• (c)The second chambers can act as a constitutional safeguard. — A strength, and in India a written one. Under Article 368 a Constitution Amendment Bill must be passed by each House separately by the required special majority, and there is no joint sitting to break a deadlock — so the Rajya Sabha is a genuine constitutional check.

A bicameral legislature has two chambers, usually differing in how they are chosen, how long members serve and what they may do. In a federation the second chamber typically represents the constituent units, which is the Rajya Sabha's role — its members are elected by the elected members of the State Legislative Assemblies, it is a permanent body that is never dissolved, and one-third of its members retire every two years. India is bicameral at the Union level and optionally so in the States: Article 169 lets Parliament create or abolish a Legislative Council for a State if that State's Assembly passes a resolution by the required majority.

The item is testing whether you can tell an argument for something from an argument against it, which is the harder half of any list-based political-theory question. The tell is in the wording — the phrase 'check on democratic rule' is doing the opposite work from 'prevent majoritarian rule'. Preventing a majority from acting hastily is presented as protecting democracy; checking democratic rule is presented as frustrating it. Add the trailing clause about non-elected or indirectly elected members and the sentence reads unmistakably as an objection. Related facts worth carrying: the Rajya Sabha has limited powers over Money Bills, which it must return within fourteen days with recommendations the Lok Sabha may reject, and it has no role in a no-confidence motion.

• The Rajya Sabha's members are elected by the elected members of the State Legislative Assemblies, and it is never dissolved; one-third retire every two years.
• Under Article 368 each House must separately pass a Constitution Amendment Bill by the required special majority, and no joint sitting is available for such a Bill.
• A joint sitting under Article 108 is available for ordinary bills but not for Money Bills or Constitution Amendment Bills.
• The Rajya Sabha must return a Money Bill within fourteen days, and its recommendations may be rejected by the Lok Sabha.
• Article 169 allows Parliament to create or abolish a State Legislative Council on a resolution of that State's Legislative Assembly.

• Reading option (d) as a strength because it contains the word 'check' — the object of the check is what changes its meaning.
• Assuming a joint sitting can resolve every deadlock; it cannot be used for a Money Bill or a Constitution Amendment Bill.
• Thinking every Indian State has a Legislative Council; only a few do, and the number has changed over time.

As an odd-one-out separating arguments for a second chamber from arguments against, or as a statements question on the Rajya Sabha's specific powers.

• practice — not a real PYQ

  A joint sitting of the two Houses of Parliament under Article 108 cannot be convened to resolve a deadlock over which one of the following?

  • (a)An ordinary bill
  • (b)A Constitution Amendment Bill
  • (c)A bill returned by the President for reconsideration
  • (d)A bill relating to a State List subject taken up under Article 249

  Answer(b) A Constitution Amendment Bill — such a bill must be passed separately by each House by the required special majority, and a Money Bill is likewise outside the joint-sitting route.

• practice — not a real PYQ

  Under the Constitution of India, a State Legislative Council may be created or abolished by

  • (a)The Governor, by notification
  • (b)The State Legislative Assembly alone
  • (c)Parliament, on a resolution passed by the State Legislative Assembly
  • (d)The President, on the advice of the Election Commission

  Answer(c) Parliament, on a resolution passed by the State Legislative Assembly — the procedure is laid down in Article 169.