BPSC 71st CCE Prelims General Studies · Question 63 of 150

Correct — A, 1 and 2 are correct. Reasonableness under Article 19 is not a free-floating sentiment; it is a judicially structured test, and statements 1 and 2 name two of its settled ingredients. Statement 1 is written into the constitutional text itself. Article 19(5), which governs restrictions on the freedom of movement and of residence, and Article 19(6), which governs the freedom to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business, both permit reasonable restrictions "in the interests of the general public" — that phrase is the operative ground in those two clauses, exactly as "sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order, decency or morality" and the rest are the operative grounds in Article 19(2) for speech. Statement 2 comes from the case law. In State of Madras v. V. G. Row (AIR 1952 SC 196) Patanjali Sastri CJ held that the test of reasonableness must be applied to each impugned statute separately and that no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down: "the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict." Prevailing social values and social needs are therefore no bar to a restriction being upheld — they are an element of the very test that decides it, which is what statement 2's awkward double negative is saying. The Commission made exactly this point when it disposed of objections on 31 October 2025, citing Articles 19(2) to 19(6) and naming V. G. Row as the key judgment. Statements 3 and 4 invert the doctrine. Article 37 makes the Directive Principles non-justiciable but "fundamental in the governance of the country", and it is the duty of the State to apply them in making laws, so they cannot be bypassed. And the collective good is not discounted but weighed: a court balances the harm done to the individual against the benefit conferred on the community. Note the Commission's own history on this item — the provisional key marked (d), Only 1 is correct, and the final revised key moved it to (a).

• (b)2 and 3 are correct — Half right and therefore dangerous. Statement 2 is sound, so a candidate who has read V. G. Row is drawn straight to this option — and then has to swallow statement 3. Courts do not treat the Directive Principles as something a restriction may set aside. Article 37 declares them fundamental in the governance of the country and a duty of the State in law-making; Parts III and IV are read harmoniously, and Minerva Mills (1980) went further and called that harmony and balance part of the basic structure. Far from being bypassed, a Directive Principle strengthens a restriction: the Minimum Wages Act was upheld in 1955 against a challenge under Article 19(1)(g) precisely because it gave effect to the living-wage principle of Article 43.
• (c)Only 4 is correct — Statement 4 says the collective good is not greater, which reverses the actual approach and, taken alone, would leave the reasonableness test with nothing to weigh a restriction against. The settled method is a balance: the court measures the harm caused to the citizen against the benefit conferred on the community, and requires a direct and proximate nexus between the restriction and the object it claims to serve. A restriction that serves a substantial community interest is more likely to be upheld, not less. Marking (c) also means discarding statement 1, which is quoted almost verbatim from the text of Articles 19(5) and 19(6).
• (d)Only 1 is correct — This was the Commission's own provisional answer, and it is the option a careful candidate most plausibly marked in the hall, because statement 1 is undeniable and statement 2 is written in a clumsy double negative that is easy to misread as a denial. On the correct reading — prevailing social values and needs are not an obstacle to a restriction being held reasonable — statement 2 is true, and it is true on the highest authority, since V. G. Row lists "the prevailing conditions at the time" among the factors that must enter the judicial verdict. BPSC accepted that argument and revised the key from (d) to (a) on 31 October 2025; the old (d) is still circulating in coaching material.

No freedom in Article 19 is absolute, and the Constitution says so clause by clause. Article 19(1) guarantees six freedoms to citizens — (a) speech and expression, (b) assembly peaceably and without arms, (c) association or union, and co-operative societies since the Ninety-seventh Amendment, 2011, (d) free movement throughout the territory of India, (e) residence and settlement, and (g) practice of any profession or the carrying on of any occupation, trade or business. The seventh, 19(1)(f) on property, was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment, 1978 and re-enacted as the ordinary legal right in Article 300A. Clauses (2) to (6) then attach a distinct set of permitted grounds to each freedom, and the mapping is what examiners test. Article 19(2) allows restrictions on speech in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Article 19(3) allows restrictions on assembly in the interests of sovereignty and integrity or public order; 19(4) adds morality for associations. Articles 19(5) and 19(6) alone use the phrase "in the interests of the general public" — 19(5) for movement and residence, with an additional ground of protecting the interests of any Scheduled Tribe, and 19(6) for profession and trade, which further saves laws prescribing professional or technical qualifications and laws creating a State monopoly. The word "reasonable" itself was inserted into Article 19(2) by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, along with public order and friendly relations with foreign States; sovereignty and integrity of India came in through the Sixteenth Amendment, 1963. Crucially, whether a restriction is reasonable is decided by the courts, statute by statute, never by the legislature's own declaration.

Work this question by elimination on the two obviously planted statements first, because the option set is built so that they collapse it. Statement 3 asks you to accept that the Directive Principles can be bypassed, which contradicts Article 37 outright, so option (b) is gone. Statement 4 asks you to accept that the collective good counts for nothing, which removes the very thing a court balances a right against, so option (c) is gone. That leaves (a) and (d), which differ on one thing only — statement 2 — and the entire question therefore reduces to whether prevailing social values and needs belong in the reasonableness test. They do, and V. G. Row says so in terms. That single fact is the discriminator, and it is also the reason the Commission revised its own key from (d) to (a) rather than deleting the question. The difficulty is not the law but the drafting: "Prevailing social value and also social needs are not bar" is a double negative, and read carelessly it sounds as though social values are being dismissed. Read it as "they are not an obstacle to a restriction being held reasonable" and it becomes a plain statement of doctrine. One further precision worth carrying out of this card, because it is where careless candidates go wrong: the Commission's remark cites the sovereignty-and-integrity ground, which lives in Articles 19(2), 19(3) and 19(4); statement 1's general-public ground lives in Articles 19(5) and 19(6). Both are permitted grounds — but they attach to different freedoms, and an option that offers 'public order' as a ground for restricting trade, or 'general public interest' as a ground for restricting speech, is wrong however familiar the phrase looks.

• The grounds are clause-specific: Article 19(2) — sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, incitement to an offence; 19(3) — sovereignty and integrity, public order; 19(4) — the same plus morality; 19(5) — the interests of the general public or the protection of any Scheduled Tribe; 19(6) — the interests of the general public, plus professional or technical qualifications and State monopoly.
• The word "reasonable" was inserted into Article 19(2) by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which also added public order and friendly relations with foreign States; the Sixteenth Amendment, 1963 added sovereignty and integrity of India; the Forty-fourth Amendment, 1978 deleted the property freedom in 19(1)(f), re-enacting it as Article 300A.
• State of Madras v. V. G. Row (AIR 1952 SC 196): no abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down — the nature of the right infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction, the extent and urgency of the evil to be remedied, the disproportion of the imposition and the prevailing conditions at the time must all enter the judicial verdict; the same factors were restated in Pathumma v. State of Kerala (1978).
• Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1951): a restriction that is arbitrary or excessive, beyond what the public interest requires, lacks the quality of reasonableness; the restriction must also bear a direct and proximate nexus to the object it claims to serve.
• Article 37: the Directive Principles are not enforceable by any court, yet are fundamental in the governance of the country and it is the duty of the State to apply them in making laws — which is why statement 3 fails; Minerva Mills (1980) treated the harmony and balance between Parts III and IV as part of the basic structure.

• Treating 'reasonable restrictions' as whatever the legislature declares reasonable — the determination is judicial and is made statute by statute
• Mixing up the grounds: 'public order' restricts speech, assembly and association, but the ground for restricting trade or movement is the interests of the general public
• Assuming a Directive Principle may be used to override a Fundamental Right, or the reverse error of treating it as irrelevant to whether a restriction is reasonable
• Misreading statement 2's double negative — 'are not bar' means social values are part of the test, not an obstacle to it
• Revising from the provisional key: this question's answer was changed from (d) to (a), and stale answer keys are still in circulation

BPSC turns doctrine into a list of loose propositions and expects you to spot the two that invert it — no case is named in the stem, and the Commission supplies the authority only afterwards in its remarks. UPSC would not phrase it this way: it tests the same idea through the text, asking which Article makes the Directive Principles fundamental in governance, or which ground appears in which clause of Article 19, or by pinning a named judgment to a right. The practical instruction is identical, though — anchor to the V. G. Row factors and to the harmonious reading of Parts III and IV, then eliminate any statement that dismisses public interest, prevailing conditions, the Directive Principles or the community's benefit.

• practice — not a real PYQ

  In which case did the Supreme Court hold that no abstract or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down, and that the nature of the right, the purpose of the restriction and the prevailing conditions must all enter the judicial verdict?

  • (a)A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)
  • (b)State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1952)
  • (c)Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)
  • (d)Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

  Answer(b) State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1952) — the classic statement of the reasonableness test under Article 19, cited by BPSC itself in its remarks on this question.

• practice — not a real PYQ

  The expression 'in the interests of the general public' as a ground for restricting a freedom appears in which clauses of Article 19?

  • (a)Clauses (2) and (3)
  • (b)Clauses (3) and (4)
  • (c)Clauses (5) and (6)
  • (d)Clauses (2) and (6)

  Answer(c) Clauses (5) and (6) — clause (5) covers freedom of movement and of residence, clause (6) the freedom to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. Clauses (2), (3) and (4) instead use grounds such as sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order and morality.