UPPSC 2025 Prelims GS Paper-I · Question 137 of 150

Correct — D, both (A) and (R) are true and (R) is the correct explanation of (A). Take the code first, because this booklet has inverted it. On an ordinary UPSC paper (a) is the 'both true and R explains A' slot and (d) is the '(A) false, (R) true' slot. Here the two have changed places: (d) carries the full agreement, (a) carries 'both true but R does not explain A'. Read the printed words, not the remembered position. Now the substance. The Assertion is true. The rule of law means, at minimum, that the law binds the state as much as the citizen and that every person can call the state to account before a court; on paper India guarantees this through Article 14 and through the right to constitutional remedies in Article 32, which Ambedkar called the very soul of the Constitution. But a remedy that exists only on paper is not the rule of law. Until the early 1980s the doctrine of locus standi meant that only the person whose own right was injured could move the court — which in practice shut out the prisoner who did not know he was entitled to bail, the bonded labourer who could not leave the quarry, and the pavement dweller who could not afford a lawyer. Public Interest Litigation dismantled that barrier: in S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) the Supreme Court held that any member of the public acting bona fide may move the court on behalf of someone unable to do so by reason of poverty or disability or a socially or economically disadvantaged position, and through its epistolary jurisdiction it began treating letters and postcards as writ petitions. The Reason is therefore true as well. And the Reason is not merely a second true fact standing alongside the first — it is the operative reason the first is true. PIL matters to the rule of law precisely because it converts a formal guarantee into an effective one for those who could not otherwise reach a court. Remove the access described in R and the claim in A collapses. Both true, R explains A, and on this paper that is option (d).

• (a)Both (A) and (R) are true, but (R) is not the correct explanation of (A) — This is the option a well-prepared candidate is most likely to mark by accident, because on a normal UPSC paper this text sits at (d) and the full-agreement text sits at (a) — the booklet has swapped them. On the merits it also fails. Both statements are true, so the option gets that far, but the explanatory link is real and direct. Access to justice for those who cannot otherwise obtain it is not an incidental benefit of PIL that happens to sit beside its constitutional value; it is the whole mechanism by which PIL serves the rule of law. Apply the deletion test: strike out the access described in R and there is nothing left to support the claim in A.
• (b)(A) is true, but (R) is false — The Reason is not false. It is the documented history of the jurisdiction. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) reached the Supreme Court on behalf of undertrial prisoners who had been in jail longer than the maximum sentence for the offence they were charged with, and produced the ruling that a speedy trial is part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) began as a letter about bonded labourers in the stone quarries of Faridabad. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) produced binding guidelines against sexual harassment at the workplace. In each case the petitioner was not the injured person, and in each case the beneficiaries were people with no realistic route to a court of their own.
• (c)(A) is false, but (R) is true — The Assertion is not false either. It is a fair statement of the settled constitutional position that the rule of law requires an effective, not merely a declared, remedy — which is why Article 32 is itself a Fundamental Right and why Article 39A directs the State to secure equal justice and free legal aid. Candidates sometimes reject the Assertion because they have read the criticism that PIL invites judicial overreach and gets misused for publicity, a concern the Supreme Court itself addressed in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) by laying down guidelines to screen out frivolous petitions. But that is an argument about how PIL should be disciplined, not a denial that it is essential; the Court framed those guidelines expressly to protect the credibility of the jurisdiction, not to dismantle it.

Public Interest Litigation is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. It is a judicial innovation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, built on the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Courts under Article 226, and associated above all with Justices P. N. Bhagwati and V. R. Krishna Iyer. Its central move was to relax the traditional rule of locus standi, under which only the person whose own legal right had been violated could approach a court. Once any public-spirited person could petition on behalf of a class unable to petition for itself, and once the Court was willing to treat a letter as a writ petition, the constitutional remedy became reachable by people for whom it had previously been theoretical. That is why PIL is discussed as an instrument of the rule of law rather than merely as a procedural convenience.

Assertion-reason items on constitutional doctrine are usually decided by asking whether the Reason supplies the mechanism of the Assertion or merely sits next to it. Here it clearly supplies the mechanism. The Assertion makes a claim about a value — the rule of law — and the Reason names the operation that delivers it. The cleanest test is deletion in both directions. Delete the Reason and the Assertion is left unsupported: why exactly would PIL be essential to the rule of law if it changed nothing about who can reach a court? Delete the Assertion and the Reason still stands as a fact but loses its point. That asymmetry is the signature of a genuine explanation, and it is what separates this item from the reversed-arrow pairs where the Assertion actually explains the Reason. Having settled the substance, read the code that is actually printed. In this booklet every one of the twenty assertion-reason questions uses the inverted layout, with the full-agreement option at (d) instead of (a). The single commonest way to lose this mark is to reason perfectly and then mark from habit.

• PIL finds no mention in the Constitution; it rests on the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Courts under Article 226, and was developed principally by Justices P. N. Bhagwati and V. R. Krishna Iyer
• S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), the Judges Transfer case, is the standard authority for relaxed locus standi — any bona fide member of the public may move the court for a person unable to do so through poverty, disability or a socially or economically disadvantaged position
• Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979), on undertrial prisoners held longer than their maximum possible sentence, is treated as the first PIL of consequence and established a speedy trial as part of Article 21
• Under its epistolary jurisdiction the Supreme Court has treated letters and postcards as writ petitions — Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984), on bonded labour in the Faridabad quarries, began that way
• Article 39A, a Directive Principle inserted by the Forty-second Amendment in 1976, directs the State to secure equal justice and free legal aid; it was given statutory shape by the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, under which NALSA functions
• The Court has itself guarded against abuse: in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) it issued guidelines to filter out frivolous and publicity-driven petitions, expressly to preserve the credibility of genuine PIL
• In this booklet all twenty assertion-reason questions use the inverted code — (d) is 'both true and R is the correct explanation', (a) is 'both true but R is not the explanation'

• The inverted code. On this booklet (d) means 'both true and R is the correct explanation' and (a) means 'both true but R does not explain A'. Reasoning correctly and then marking the remembered position is the single commonest way to lose this mark
• Assuming PIL is a constitutional provision. It is a judge-made doctrine built on existing writ jurisdiction, which is why no Article number can be cited for PIL itself
• Treating the criticism of PIL as a refutation of the Assertion. Concerns about overreach and publicity-driven petitions, which the Supreme Court answered with the Balwant Singh Chaufal guidelines, are arguments about discipline, not about whether the jurisdiction matters

UPPSC likes assertion-reason pairs in which a constitutional value is paired with the mechanism that delivers it, and it also asks the underlying writ provisions directly, as it did in 2023 on the Supreme Court's power to issue writs under Article 32. UPSC has generally asked PIL as a factual item — where the concept originated, which judge pioneered it, whether a particular judge was Chief Justice — so both the doctrinal and the biographical layers are worth holding.

• practice — not a real PYQ

  In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court of India significantly relax the rule of locus standi, holding that any member of the public acting bona fide may approach the Court on behalf of a person unable to do so by reason of poverty or disability ?

  • (a)Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
  • (b)S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981)
  • (c)Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)
  • (d)Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

  Answer(b) S. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) — the Judges Transfer case, the standard authority for relaxed locus standi and therefore for Public Interest Litigation. Kesavananda gave the basic structure doctrine, Minerva Mills struck down parts of the Forty-second Amendment, and Maneka Gandhi expanded Article 21.

• practice — not a real PYQ

  Which one of the following provisions of the Constitution of India directs the State to secure equal justice and to provide free legal aid ?

  • (a)Article 32
  • (b)Article 38
  • (c)Article 39A
  • (d)Article 44

  Answer(c) Article 39A — a Directive Principle inserted by the Forty-second Amendment Act, 1976, later given statutory effect by the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Article 32 is the right to constitutional remedies, Article 38 concerns social order and welfare, and Article 44 the uniform civil code.