Which of the following are matters on which a constitutional amendment is possible only with the ratification of the legislature of not less than one-half of the states ? 1. Election of the President. 2. Representation of States in Parliament. 3. Any of the lists in the 7th Schedule. 4. Abolition of the Legislative Council of a State. Choose the correct answer.
- (a)1, 3 and 4
- (b)1, 2 and 3
- (c)1, 2 and 4
- (d)2, 3 and 4
Correct — B, 1, 2 and 3. Article 368 provides three routes for amending the Constitution: by a simple majority of those present and voting, for matters the Constitution itself takes out of Article 368 such as the creation of new States; by a special majority of each House — a majority of the total membership plus two-thirds of those present and voting; and, for a short entrenched list, by that special majority PLUS ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States. The proviso to Article 368(2) sets out the entrenched list, and three of the four statements here are on it. Statement 1, the election of the President, is listed because Articles 54 and 55 govern that election and both are named in the proviso — the electoral college includes the elected members of every State Assembly, so the States have a direct stake. Statement 2, the representation of States in Parliament, is listed because it turns on the Fourth Schedule, which allots Rajya Sabha seats to the States. Statement 3, any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, is listed because those Lists are the division of legislative power itself, and neither level of government can be allowed to rewrite the other's competence alone. The remaining entrenched matters, not offered here, are the extent of the executive power of the Union and of the States, the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States, the representation of States in Parliament, and Article 368 itself. Statement 4 is the trap and the whole question. Creating or abolishing a State Legislative Council is governed by Article 169, not Article 368: Parliament may do it by ORDINARY law once the State's own Legislative Assembly passes a resolution by a special majority, and Article 169(3) says in terms that such a law shall not be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368. No ratification by other States is involved — indeed no other State is consulted at all. Statement 4 therefore falls, and with it options (a), (c) and (d), each of which contains it.
- (a)1, 3 and 4 — Correct about the President's election and the Seventh Schedule, but it admits statement 4 and drops statement 2. Representation of the States in Parliament is squarely inside the proviso to Article 368(2), because it works through the Fourth Schedule, which fixes how many Rajya Sabha seats each State gets.
- (c)1, 2 and 4 — Gets the two federal-representation items right and then swaps the Seventh Schedule for the abolition of a Legislative Council — which is the exact opposite of the constitutional position. The Seventh Schedule is the most obviously entrenched item on the list, since it defines what the States may legislate on at all.
- (d)2, 3 and 4 — Drops the election of the President, which is explicitly protected by the proviso through Articles 54 and 55, and again admits the Legislative Council item. Any option containing statement 4 can be struck out immediately once Article 169(3) is remembered.
The Indian amendment procedure is deliberately neither as rigid as the American nor as flexible as the British. Article 368 lets a Bill be introduced in either House — no prior recommendation of the President is needed, and it may be a private member's Bill — and requires it to be passed by each House separately by a special majority; there is no provision for a joint sitting if the Houses disagree. For the entrenched matters listed in the proviso, ratification by the legislatures of at least half the States must follow, and only then does the Bill go to the President, who under the Twenty-fourth Amendment is bound to assent. The federal logic of the proviso is easy to state: any change that alters the relationship between the Union and the States, or the States' share in central institutions, requires the States' own consent. Over and above all of this sits the basic structure doctrine from Kesavananda Bharati (1973), under which even a properly ratified amendment can be struck down if it damages the Constitution's basic structure.
The way to answer entrenched-list questions quickly is to ask of each item: does this change what the States have, or how the States are represented? Election of the President — the States vote in the electoral college, so yes. Representation of States in Parliament — obviously yes. Seventh Schedule — it defines State legislative power, so yes. Abolition of a State Legislative Council — this affects one State's internal arrangement and nobody else's, so no, and that intuition is exactly what Article 169 codifies. The second habit is to notice which statement appears in three of the four options, because settling that one statement usually settles the question: here statement 4 appears in (a), (c) and (d), so knowing Article 169 alone is enough to answer without evaluating anything else. Note also that Article 169 has been used: Andhra Pradesh's Council was abolished in 1985 and revived in 2007, and Tamil Nadu's was abolished in 1986 — each time by ordinary legislation of Parliament following a resolution of the State Assembly, with no other State's ratification sought.
- The proviso to Article 368(2) requires ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States for amendments affecting: the election of the President (Articles 54 and 55), the extent of the executive power of the Union and of the States, the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States, any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, the representation of States in Parliament, and Article 368 itself.
- Ratification requires a simple majority in the State legislatures, no time limit is prescribed, and a State that has ratified may not withdraw its ratification.
- Article 169 allows Parliament to create or abolish a State Legislative Council by ordinary law, on a resolution passed by the State's Legislative Assembly by a special majority; Article 169(3) provides that such a law is not deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368.
- A Constitution Amendment Bill may be introduced in either House by a minister or a private member, needs no prior recommendation of the President, and cannot be sent to a joint sitting if the two Houses disagree.
- Since the Twenty-fourth Amendment of 1971 the President is obliged to give assent to a Constitution Amendment Bill; and since Kesavananda Bharati (1973) an amendment may still be struck down if it damages the basic structure.
Statement 4 appears in three of the four options, so settling Article 169 settles the question on its own — which is the fastest route through any statement-list item.
- Treating the abolition of a State Legislative Council as a constitutional amendment. Article 169(3) says in terms that it is not one.
- Confusing 'ratification by half the States' with a requirement of unanimity or of a majority of the States that respond. It is not less than one-half of all the States, by simple majority in each.
- Assuming every item on the entrenched list is federal in an obvious way. The election of the President is on it, because the States form part of the electoral college.
BPSC asks Article 368 as a four-statement list with one Article 169 item planted to break it, which is the single most productive trap in the whole amendment chapter. UPSC has used the identical question with the identical four statements in 1995, and returned to the same proviso in 2025 with a fresh statement list — the extent of a State's executive power and the conditions of the Governor's office — so the entrenched list has to be known item by item rather than by the shape of a remembered answer.
Which of the following are matters on which a constitutional amendment is possible only with the ratification of the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States? I. Election of the President II. Representation of States in Parliament III. Any of the Lists in the 7th Schedule IV. Abolition of the Legislative Council of a State Choose the correct answer from the codes given below:
- (a) I, II and III
- (b) I, II and IV
- (c) I, III and IV
- (d) II, III and IV
Answer(a) I, II and III
UPSC put the same four statements to its candidates thirty years earlier, and its published key names the same three — the President's election, the representation of States in Parliament and the Seventh Schedule Lists — while rejecting the abolition of a State Legislative Council. Note that the letter differs between the two papers even though the words do not, which is why an option's text and never its letter is what should be matched.
Consider the following subjects under the Constitution of India: I. List I — Union List, in the Seventh Schedule II. Extent of the executive power of a State III. Conditions of the Governor’s office For a constitutional amendment with respect to which of the above, ratification by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States is required before presenting the Bill to the President of India for assent?
- (a) I and II only
- (b) II and III only
- (c) I and III only
- (d) I, II and III
Answer(a) I and II only
The same proviso with a fresh statement list, showing how the question evolves. The Seventh Schedule and the extent of a State's executive power are both on the entrenched list; the conditions of the Governor's office are not — a reminder that the list must be learned item by item and not by the shape of a previously seen answer.
Which of the following is/are the consequence(s) of invoking Article 360, declaration of a financial emergency? 1. The President may order the States to reduce the salaries and allowances of all or any class of employees serving in connection with the State affairs. 2. Money Bills or other financial bills passed by the State Legislature are not required to be reserved for the consideration of the President. 3. The President can issue directions for the reduction of salaries and allowances of all or any class of employees serving in connection with the affairs of the Union, including the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. 4. Money Bills or other financial bills are to be reserved for the consideration of the President after they are passed by the Legislature of the State. Select the correct answer using the codes given below.
- (a) Only 1, 3 and 4
- (b) Only 2
- (c) Only 1 and 2
- (d) All of the above
Answer(a) Only 1, 3 and 4
The 69th CCE ran the same drill on a different Article — take a numbered list of consequences and check each against the constitutional text rather than against a general impression. Both questions are decided by the one statement that a candidate has to have read the Article to judge.
- practice — not a real PYQ
The creation or abolition of a Legislative Council in a State is carried out by
- (a)a constitutional amendment under Article 368 with ratification by half the States
- (b)an ordinary law of Parliament following a resolution of the State Legislative Assembly
- (c)an order of the President on the advice of the Governor
- (d)a resolution of the State Legislative Assembly alone
Answer(b) an ordinary law of Parliament following a resolution of the State Legislative Assembly — the procedure in Article 169, which expressly provides that such a law is not deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution.
- practice — not a real PYQ
A Constitution Amendment Bill in India
- (a)requires the prior recommendation of the President before introduction
- (b)may be introduced only in the Lok Sabha
- (c)may be introduced in either House by a minister or a private member
- (d)may be referred to a joint sitting if the two Houses disagree
Answer(c) may be introduced in either House by a minister or a private member — no prior presidential recommendation is needed, and there is no provision for a joint sitting on a Constitution Amendment Bill, which must be passed separately by each House by a special majority.