MPSC 2026 Prelims Paper-I · Question 82 of 100

Correct — option (3), '(a), (b) and (d)'. The whole question turns on one distinction: which parts of the Constitution can be altered by an ordinary law passed like any other Bill, and which need the machinery of Article 368. Article 368 recognises two amending procedures — a special majority of each House (a majority of the total membership of that House and not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting), and for the genuinely federal provisions that special majority plus ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States. Alongside these sits a third category that is not mentioned in Article 368 at all. A number of provisions can be changed by Parliament by a simple majority of members present and voting, in the ordinary legislative way, and the Constitution takes care to say that such a change is not an amendment for the purposes of Article 368 at all — Article 4(2) says so for laws that create or reorganise States, and Article 169(3) says so for the abolition or creation of State Legislative Councils. Statement (a) belongs squarely in that third category. Article 2 empowers Parliament to admit into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, and Article 3 lets it form new States and alter the areas, boundaries or names of existing ones. Article 4 then provides that any law under Article 2 or 3 may make the consequential changes to the First and Fourth Schedules, and shall not be deemed an amendment of the Constitution. So new States are made by simple majority. Statement (a) is correct. Statement (b) is correct for the same reason. The President's emoluments and allowances are fixed in the Second Schedule, and Article 59(3) provides that the President is entitled to such emoluments and allowances as are specified in that Schedule until Parliament by law determines otherwise. Because Parliament can determine them by ordinary law, the Second Schedule entries for the President, Governors, Speakers and judges fall in the simple-majority list. Statement (d) is likewise correct: delimitation of constituencies is carried out under a Delimitation Act passed by Parliament in the ordinary way, and is one of the standard items in the simple-majority list. Statement (c) is the false one, and it decides the question by itself. The Directive Principles of State Policy are Part IV of the Constitution, and to change them Parliament must use Article 368 with a special majority. Every option that contains (c) — option (1), option (2) and option (4) — therefore fails, and only option (3) is left standing.

• (1)(a) and (c) — Statement (a) is right but statement (c) is not: the Directive Principles are Part IV of the Constitution and can only be amended under Article 368 by a special majority of each House. Nothing in Part IV can be altered by an ordinary Bill. This option also silently rejects (b) and (d), both of which are genuine simple-majority items, so it fails on three counts.
• (2)(c) and (d) — Delimitation of constituencies in (d) is correctly a simple-majority matter, but pairing it with (c) is fatal — amending the Directive Principles needs the special majority of Article 368. The option additionally drops (a), the creation of new States, which Article 4(2) expressly declares is not an amendment of the Constitution at all and so travels by simple majority.
• (4)(a), (c) and (d) — This is the near-miss designed to catch a candidate who has learnt that States and delimitation are simple-majority items but has not thought about Part IV. Two of its three components, (a) and (d), are right; the inclusion of (c) sinks it. It also leaves out (b), the President's emoluments under the Second Schedule, which Article 59(3) allows Parliament to determine by ordinary law.

The Indian Constitution is neither flexible like the British constitution nor rigid like the American, and its amendment scheme is the reason. Three routes exist. First, provisions amendable by a simple majority of Parliament in the ordinary legislative way, which are not treated as constitutional amendments at all: admission and establishment of new States and the alteration of their areas, boundaries and names (Articles 2, 3 and 4); creation or abolition of State Legislative Councils (Article 169); the Second Schedule on emoluments and allowances of the President, Governors, Speakers and judges; quorum in Parliament; salaries and allowances of members of Parliament; parliamentary privileges and rules of procedure; use of English in Parliament; the number of puisne judges of the Supreme Court and conferment of further jurisdiction on it; citizenship; elections to Parliament and State legislatures and the delimitation of constituencies; the Union territories; and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules. Second, the Article 368 special majority, which covers most of the Constitution including the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. Third, the special majority plus ratification by at least half the State legislatures, reserved for provisions that touch the federal structure — the election of the President, the extent of Union and State executive power, the Supreme Court and High Courts, the distribution of legislative powers, the Seventh Schedule, representation of States in Parliament, and Article 368 itself.

The examiner's favourite trick in this topic is to slip one Article 368 item into a list of ordinary-law items, because candidates memorise the simple-majority list as a block and stop checking. Here the intruder is the Directive Principles. It is worth remembering why the framers made new States a matter of simple majority: the reorganisation of a young and linguistically diverse Union was expected to be frequent, and requiring a two-thirds majority and State ratification for every boundary change would have frozen the map. The counterpart safeguard in Article 3 is a procedural one, not a majority one — the Bill needs the President's prior recommendation, and where it affects a State the President must refer it to that State's legislature for its views within a specified period. Those views are not binding, which is one of the strongest centralising features of Indian federalism and a reason scholars have hesitated to call the Constitution fully federal.

• Article 368 provides two amendment procedures — special majority of each House, and special majority plus ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States; the simple-majority category lies outside Article 368 altogether
• Article 4(2) provides that a law made under Article 2 or Article 3, including its consequential changes to the First and Fourth Schedules, shall not be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368
• Article 59(3): the President is entitled to such emoluments and allowances as are specified in the Second Schedule until Parliament by law determines otherwise — hence a simple-majority matter
• Elections to Parliament and the State legislatures, and the delimitation of constituencies, are in the simple-majority list; so are citizenship, parliamentary privileges and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules
• The Directive Principles (Part IV) and the Fundamental Rights (Part III) are both amended by the Article 368 special majority; neither can be altered by an ordinary Bill

• Reading 'simple majority' as majority of the total membership. A simple majority is a majority of the members present and voting; the majority of total membership requirement belongs to the special majority of Article 368
• Assuming that anything printed in a Schedule needs a constitutional amendment. The Second Schedule can be changed by ordinary law, and so can the Fifth and Sixth Schedules — but the Seventh Schedule needs the special majority plus ratification by half the States
• Confusing the two Article 368 routes. Most of the Constitution needs only a special majority; State ratification is required only for the specific federal provisions listed in the proviso to Article 368(2)

This is one of the most heavily recycled areas of Indian Polity. The usual form is a mixed list, as here, where the candidate must sort items into the simple-majority bucket and the Article 368 bucket. A second form asks which of a set of provisions requires ratification by half the States — the Seventh Schedule, the election of the President and the representation of States in Parliament are the perennial answers. A third form is a single-line question on Article 4 or Article 169, testing whether you know that such laws are not deemed amendments at all. Learning the three buckets as three lists, and being able to say which Article puts each item in its bucket, answers all three.

No directly related past PYQ was found.

• practice — not a real PYQ

  Which one of the following amendments of the Constitution requires ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States ?

  • (a)Amendment of the Directive Principles of State Policy
  • (b)Amendment of the Seventh Schedule
  • (c)Creation of a new State by altering the boundary of an existing State
  • (d)Change in the emoluments of the President

  Answer(b) Amendment of the Seventh Schedule — the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States is one of the federal provisions listed in the proviso to Article 368(2), so it needs the special majority plus ratification by at least half the State legislatures. The Directive Principles need only a special majority; creating a new State and changing the President's emoluments are both simple-majority matters.

• practice — not a real PYQ

  A law made by Parliament under Article 3 of the Constitution for the formation of a new State :

  • (a)requires ratification by at least half of the State legislatures
  • (b)requires a special majority in both Houses of Parliament
  • (c)is not deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368
  • (d)requires the prior consent of the State whose boundary is affected

  Answer(c) is not deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 — Article 4(2) says so expressly, which is why such a law passes by simple majority. The affected State's legislature must be given the opportunity to express its views on the President's reference, but its consent is not required and its views do not bind Parliament.